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Legal cases involve reasoning with evidence and with the
development of a software support tool in mind, a formal
foundation for evidential reasoning is required. Three ap-
proaches to evidential reasoning have been prominent in the
literature: argumentation, narrative and probabilistic rea-
soning. In this paper a combination of the latter two is
proposed.
In recent research on Bayesian networks applied to legal
cases, a number of legal idioms have been developed as re-
curring structures in legal Bayesian networks. A Bayesian
network quantifies how various variables in a case interact.
In the narrative approach, scenarios provide a context for
the evidence in a case. A method that integrates the quan-
titative, numerical techniques of Bayesian networks with the
qualitative, holistic approach of scenarios is lacking.
In this paper, a method is proposed for modeling several
scenarios in a single Bayesian network. The method is tested
by doing a case study. Two new idioms are introduced: the
scenario idiom and the merged scenarios idiom. The result-
ing network is meant to assist a judge or jury, helping to
maintain a good overview of the interactions between rel-
evant variables in a case and preventing tunnel vision by
comparing various scenarios.
1. INTRODUCTION
Problematic legal cases have recently called for a scientif-
ically founded method of dealing with the qualitative and
quantitative roles of evidence in a case. By developing a
formal method, we aim to lay the foundations for the devel-
opment of a software support tool that can deal with evi-
dential reasoning in legal cases. Such a tool is meant to be
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used by a judge or juror, in collaboration with various ex-
perts who can provide information about the details. This
will hopefully improve the communication between judges
or jurors and experts.
Three approaches to evidential reasoning have been lead-
ing in the literature: argumentation, narrative and proba-
bilistic reasoning [16, 25]. In a previous project [6, 5, 7,
8], the combination of narrative and argumentation for le-
gal cases was studied, which led to the development of a
hybrid theory combining the two approaches. In this paper
we study the combination of narrative with a probabilistic
approach, proposing a systematic method for modeling legal
scenarios in a Bayesian network.
A scenario is a coherent presentation of a sequence of
events [6] and captures the greater picture of what may have
happened at a crime scene. It provides a context for the
available evidence. Judges and jurors are used to thinking
in terms of stories or scenarios, and use scenarios to orga-
nize the evidence [20]. Based on these scenarios, we aim to
systematically construct a Bayesian network modeling the
case.
Bayesian networks have been studied as a tool for prob-
abilistic reasoning about legal cases [14, 17, 18, 24]. The
application of Bayesian methods in court is currently the
subject of debate, so more research is needed [10]. On one
hand, in the UK the Court of Appeal ruled in 2010 that
Bayes’ theorem should not be used in evaluating evidence,
except for DNA and ‘possibly other areas where there is a
firm statistical base’ [1]. On the other hand, in the Nether-
lands the use of Bayesian thinking has recently been ad-
vocated by a member of the Supreme Court together with
the Netherlands Forensic Institute (Nederlands Forensisch
Instituut, NFI) [3, 4, 2].
A Bayesian network is a representation of a joint prob-
ability distribution over a collection of relevant variables.
The graphical structure shows the (in)dependencies between
the variables in a case. In the application of Bayesian net-
works to legal cases, the graph usually contains one or more
nodes with hypotheses (such as ‘suspect X is guilty’), nodes
with evidence (such as ‘a fingerprint match was found with
suspect X’) and possibly some intermediate nodes (such as
‘suspect X was at the crime scene’ or ‘suspect X left a fin-
gerprint’). Arrows between nodes are drawn whenever there
is some probabilistic dependency between the variables (for
example, between ‘suspect X left a fingerprint’ and ‘a fin-
gerprint match was found with suspect X’).
When constructing a Bayesian network for a legal case, it
is not always clear which variables are relevant to the case.
This contrasts with, for example, the medical field where for
most patients coming in with a set of symptoms, a doctor
knows in advance which tests will be relevant to perform,
what their possible outcomes are, and how these outcomes
are related to various diagnoses. In other words, in many
cases a previously developed Bayesian network can be used,
and diagnosing a patient consists of instantiating the nodes
in the network with the outcomes of the tests.
As opposed to this relatively closed world of medical test-
ing, the legal field is often an open world where unpre-
dictable relevant circumstances might turn up. For example,
the fact that a bus did not run on schedule on the morning
of the crime may turn out to be important when the sus-
pect’s alibi includes taking this bus to work that day. As
yet, there is for domains like the legal field no systematic
approach to decide which variables should be included in a
Bayesian network for a case.
In this paper, we propose such a systematic method, mod-
eling crime scenarios in a Bayesian network. We argue that
scenarios provide an advantage for determining which vari-
ables are relevant, because of their holistic point of view.
A scenario makes sense of the collection of variables in a
case by putting them in a coherent whole [22]. The local
coherence of a scenario connects states and events that are
directly related. And there is a global coherence between all
states and events in one scenario, simply because together
they form one scenario.
Currently, our focus lies on constructing the graphical
structure of a Bayesian network. The resulting network is
explicitly not intended to make a decision, but rather to
advise and assist a judge or jury in making the decision.
Moreover, however accurate the model, making a decision
about one individual remains a delicate matter. One can
always argue that this particular suspect was an exception
or an outlier with respect to the probabilities. Therefore,
the model should be used to compare how probable various
scenarios are given the evidence, rather than to calculate an
absolute probability.
Using the resulting Bayesian network, a judge or jury can
evaluate the scenarios in a case. Studying the graphical
structure, he or she can gain much insight into how the
variables are connected. Furthermore, considering multiple
scenarios prevents tunnel vision.
Our method builds upon work by Hepler, Dawid and Leu-
cari [14] and Fenton, Neil and Lagnado [13, 11, 12, 18], who
proposed to approach the construction of Bayesian networks
via smaller substructures. The latter authors developed a
list of legal idioms, substructures that often occur in the ap-
plication of Bayesian networks to legal cases. We extend
their list with a scenario idiom and a merged scenarios id-
iom. Furthermore, we add to their work a procedure for the
global structure of a full Bayesian network, employing the
local structures of the idioms.
In this paper, we follow the method of first developing a
design method, and then testing this method by means of a
case study. The design method for modeling crime scenarios
in a Bayesian network is presented in Section 3, illustrated
Figure 1: Example of a Bayesian network
Fingerprints X = yes Fingerprints X = no
0.2 0.8
Table 1: The prior probability P (Fingerprints X)
FP X = yes FP X = no
Fingerprint match = yes 0.9 0.01
Fingerprint match = no 0.1 0.99
Table 2: CPT for P (Fingerprint match| Fingerprints
X on windowsill)
with brief examples. The case study is performed in Section
4. In Section 5 the properties of the proposed method are
discussed. The paper concludes with a section on related
work (Section 6) and a conclusion.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A Bayesian network is a representation of a joint probability
distribution (JPD) [15]. A JPD is a function that, for all
combinations of values of variables in the domain, gives the
probability that they occur. The graphical structure of a
Bayesian network is a way to represent the independencies
between variables in a JPD: when there is no arrow between
two nodes in the Bayesian network, then the corresponding
variables are independent given all other variables in the
domain. When there is an arrow, this means that there
is some correlation between two variables. The arrows are
commonly directed from cause to effect [24], but represent
correlation rather than causality [9].
Each node in a Bayesian network has a conditional prob-
ability table (CPT). Such an CPT gives the (conditional)
probability of the different values of a variable, conditioned
on the different value combinations for all its direct predeces-
sors. Figure 1 shows a Bayesian network, with probability
tables as in Tables 1 and 2. In combination with the graph
representing (in)dependencies, these probability tables de-
fine a full joint probability distribution.
After constructing the network, variables can be instanti-
ated whenever their value is observed in practice. Inference
in the network now results in updated posterior probabil-
ities given all observed values in the network. Depending
on the types of connections, the (in)dependencies between
variables may change as a result of instantiating variables.
When two variables are connected through a chain that does
not contain so-called head-to-head nodes (a variable with two
incoming arrows), the chain is said to be active if and only
if none of the variables on the chain is instantiated. A chain
that includes a head-to-head node is inactive if neither the
Figure 2: The scenario idiom
head-to-head node, nor any of its descendants, is instan-
tiated. Two nodes are said to be d-connected if they are
connected by a least one active chain; otherwise they are
d-separated [15].
A Bayesian network is a compact representation of a joint
probability distribution over all relevant variables. Con-
structing a Bayesian network implies that there is knowl-
edge of all these probabilities, but in practice this is usually
not the case. Eliciting the numbers is a known issue in
Bayesian network modeling. In some cases the probabili-
ties are straightforward (for example, numbers concerning
the accuracy of a DNA-test are usually available), while in
other cases they are not. Several methods are available for
guiding an expert to determine such numbers (see [21]).
3. DESIGN METHOD
In this section the design method for modeling crime sce-
narios in a Bayesian network is described. The goal of
the method is to model all scenarios for a legal case in
one Bayesian network, connecting them to the available ev-
idence. In Section 3.1 the new idioms are introduced and in
Section 3.2 the procedure of the design method is presented.
3.1 The scenario idiom and the merged sce-
narios idiom
Consider the following example of a scenario:
Suspect X had a fight with the victim. A knife
was lying on the kitchen counter. The victim
said something insulting, so X took the knife and
stabbed the victim.
It describes a typical situation of a violent fight: the suspect
snapped and took up the knife that happened to be lying
around. This sequence of states and events is a coherent
scenario that follows a typical crime pattern. The coher-
ence will be captured in the scenario idiom by connecting
all states and events in the scenario to one scenario node.
Furthermore, there are some obvious connections in the sce-
nario, such as ‘the victim said something insulting, so X took
the knife...’ which describes a motive. Such connections will
be modeled as arrows between states or events in the story.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the scenario idiom. It
consists of a scenario node which is connected to all states
and events in the scenario. The dotted arrows suggest that
there can be connections between states and events within
the scenario, including multiple dependencies (not shown).
Figure 3: The merged scenarios idiom
All nodes in the structure are binary, with values true and
false.
The scenario node is connected to a guilt hypothesis node.
A guilt hypothesis states that some suspect is guilty or in-
nocent of some crime. This is modeled as a separate node
because this is ultimately what a judge or jury wants to de-
cide upon. As the scenario node becomes more probable,
the guilt hypothesis node will also become more probable.
The scenario above supports the hypothesis that X is
guilty of manslaughter. Other scenarios can support the hy-
pothesis that X is guilty of murder, or that another person
Y is guilty of manslaughter. There can be scenarios without
a guilt hypothesis; a scenario in which the victim acciden-
tally fell on the knife does not support anyone committing
any crime. In that case, the guilt hypothesis node is left out
of the scenario idiom. Note that the victim falling on the
knife does not disprove any guilt hypothesis either; it just
supplies an alternative explanation.
After each scenario is put into the form of a scenario id-
iom, these are combined in one Bayesian network using the
merged scenarios idiom. This idiom puts a constraint on the
guilt hypotheses of the previously constructed scenario id-
ioms, see Figure 3. The constraint makes sure that mutually
exclusive guilt hypotheses cannot occur simultaneously.
3.2 The design method in four steps
Given a legal case, the design of a Bayesian network consists
of four steps.
Step 1 is to collect all relevant scenarios, and decide which
guilt hypotheses they support. It is important that these
hypotheses are formulated such that they are either equal,
or mutually exclusive (this will be important for the merged
scenarios idiom). It is possible that a scenario does not
support any guilt hypothesis; see the case study below.
In step 2 the scenario idiom is filled in for each scenario.
The scenario idiom can be constructed from a scenario by
following these three steps:
2a Include a binary node with values true and false for
each state/event in the scenario (for convenience, the
order in which the states and events were presented in
the scenario can be kept as the ordering of the nodes
from left to right). Whenever events or states are de-
Scenario node = y Scenario node = n
Event = y 1 x
Event = n 0 1-x
Table 3: CPT for an event node only connected to
the scenario node
pendent on each other (see [19] for dependencies be-
tween variables), draw an arrow between the corre-
sponding nodes. Check that unconnected nodes are
really independent, since in a Bayesian network the
absence of an arrow always implies independence.
2b For each scenario distinguished in step 1, include a sce-
nario node with values true and false, and draw an ar-
row from the scenario node to all state and event nodes
in that scenario. The probability table for an event
node expresses how strongly an event is connected to
other states and events to which it is connected. As for
the connection with the scenario node, when the sce-
nario node is true, the event is true with probability
1. When the scenario node is false, the numbers ex-
press how probable the event is without the scenario
being true. A probability table for an event node only
connected to the scenario node is shown in Table 3.
The prior probability for the scenario node expresses
the plausibility of the scenario: how probable the sce-
nario is when no evidence was taken into account. The
plausibility of a scenario is said to depend on how
well a scenario can be understood using common sense
knowledge (see [6, 26]). Therefore, the corresponding
prior probability can very well be a quite subjective
estimation of a judge or jury, supported by his or her
common sense knowledge.
2c Include a node with values true and false for the guilt
hypothesis that each scenario supports. Draw an ar-
row from the scenario node to the guilt hypothesis.
Later on, it may be that multiple scenario nodes are
connected to the same guilt hypothesis (they draw the
same conclusion on a suspect’s guilt, but via a different
account of what happened). In that case, the proba-
bility table can be more intricate. At this stage we
can set the probability table to imply that the guilt
hypothesis is true exactly when the scenario node is
true.
For the example scenario of the violent fight, all events such
as ‘the victim said something insulting’ or states such as
‘a knife was lying around on the kitchen counter’ will be
modeled as a node in the structure. Connections within the
scenario will be drawn when they are present, such as, for
example, between ‘the victim said something insulting’ and
‘X took the knife’. The coherence we previously mentioned
is represented in the fact that they are all connected to one
scenario node.
The probability tables will incorporate how probable an
event is without the context of the scenario. The lower this
probability, the more the likelihood depends on the coher-
ence of the scenario. This global coherence will be of impor-
tance when the network is used for the evaluation of a case
and evidence nodes are instantiated. Then all states and
events in one scenario become more probable when evidence
for single events or states are added (see Section 5).
Guilt hyp.1 = y Guilt hyp.1 = n
GH2 = y GH2 = n GH2 = y GH2 = n
allowed 0 1 1 1
not allowed 1 0 0 0
Table 4: CPT for the constraint node
Step 3 is to merge all scenario idioms with the merged
scenarios idiom (see Figure 3), which puts a constraint on
the guilt hypotheses. When guilt hypothesis nodes con-
nected to different scenario nodes express equal hypotheses,
they are replaced by one node connected to both scenario
nodes. The probability table for the one new node expresses
that the guilt hypothesis is true when either one of the sce-
narios to which it is connected is true1. By construction
(see step 1), the remaining guilt hypotheses are mutually
exclusive. The constraint from the merged scenarios idiom
is then only connected to mutually exclusive hypotheses, as
was intended.
The constraint node (see also [13]) of the merged scenar-
ios idiom has values allowed and not allowed and is al-
ways instantiated to have the value allowed. This forces
the Bayesian network to behave as desired. In the probabil-
ity table, the probability that the constraint is allowed is 0
when two mutually exclusive hypotheses are true simultane-
ously, and 1 in all other cases2, see Table 4.
After merging all scenarios into one Bayesian network,
there can be additional dependencies that have not yet been
modeled as an arrow. These additional dependencies can oc-
cur between state or event nodes in different scenario idioms.
We assume that the scenarios are self-contained in the sense
that when a state or event is influential for a scenario, then
it is already in the scenario. If this is not the case and ad-
ditional dependencies with events from other scenarios turn
up, then the scenarios should be reformulated to contain all
relevant events. Then, the only dependencies that can oc-
cur between two scenario idioms are two nodes that describe
equal states or events, or two nodes that describe states or
events inconsistent with each other.
Therefore, when using the merged scenarios idiom, the
following situations need to be taken care of:
3a nodes describing equal states, events or evidence;
3b nodes describing conflicting states, events or evidence;
When nodes describing the same state, event or evidence
(item 3a) occur in different scenarios, they are replaced by
one node for that state, event or evidence. Any nodes that
were connected to the original nodes will now be connected
to the one resulting node. For example, an alternative sce-
nario to the violent fight above is that suspect X intended
to kill the victim all along, and therefore brought the knife
himself. In this scenario, the event that X stabbed the vic-
tim is still present, but the rest of the scenario is different.
1Alternatively, the probability table can be adapted to ex-
press that the probability of guilt should increase more when
both scenarios are the case.
2In this construction, the constraint node only makes sure
that no two mutually exclusive hypotheses occur together.
When the hypotheses are also exhaustive so at least one
of them should occur, then the constraint node could have
probability 0 for the value allowed when none of the hy-
potheses are the case.
In the resulting Bayesian network, there will be only one
node for the event ‘X stabbed the victim’, that is connected
to both scenario nodes. Two different scenarios may contain
states or events that cannot possibly occur simultaneously
(item 3b). In that case, a constraint is put on these states or
events with a constraint node as used on the guilt hypothe-
ses.
Step 4 is the final step and consists of adding all relevant
evidential nodes to the structure. For each piece of evidence
that has been found in the investigative process, a binary
evidence node will be included. Furthermore, when a specific
piece of evidence can be expected as a result from a scenario,
a binary evidential node is included for this evidence, even
when it has not yet been found.
Each evidential node will be connected to the event or
state node in the scenario it supports. Note that one piece
of evidence may support multiple states or events in differ-
ent scenarios. Intermediate nodes may be required to model
the interpretation of the evidence: suppose a witness tes-
tified that he heard suspect X fight with the victim. The
interpretation of this piece of evidence is that the witness
did in fact hear the two fight, which we can connect to the
event ‘Suspect X had a fight with the victim’. However, it
is very well possible that the witness lied, meaning that the
interpretation is incorrect. We model this in the structure
using Fenton, Neil and Lagnado’s ‘evidence accuracy idiom’
[13]. Finally, there may be dependencies between pieces of
evidence, which can be represented in the Bayesian network
using Fenton, Neil and Lagnado’s idioms for dependency be-
tween evidence.
To summarize, our design method consists of the following
four steps:
1. Formulate all scenarios and decide which hypotheses
they support. Make sure that hypotheses are either
exactly the same, or mutually exclusive.
2. Represent each scenario in a scenario idiom.
3. Merge multiple scenarios using the merged scenarios
idiom.
4. Extend the structure with relevant evidence.
The resulting graph will be connected, since different sce-
narios either point to the same guilt hypothesis, or to mutu-
ally exclusive hypotheses that are connected via a constraint
node.
4. CASE STUDY
In this section, we test our design method to an actual case.
We model a Dutch case from www.rechtspraak.nl. The case
(registered as JLN BO 4007) concerns a burglary in which
a number of items were stolen.
A window was broken and fingerprints of suspect X were
found at the window. X explained these fingerprints with
an alibi saying that he climbed on that window a few days
earlier because he heard someone calling his name while he
walked by, drunk. However, the windows were cleaned just
before the burglary, which would almost certainly have re-
moved earlier fingerprints.
The stolen items were found with another suspect, call
him Y. An earlier conviction supposedly showed that X and
Y had worked together in the past, which led to the con-
viction of X as an accessory. However, when the case was
Figure 4: The scenario idiom for the first scenario
Figure 5: A constraint on mutually exclusive hy-
potheses. The collection of states and events in each
scenario is shown as a dotted box for simplicity.
reopened no documents on an earlier conviction could be
found.
In the sections below, we will show how our design method
from Section 3 can be used to construct a Bayesian network
for the case. The structure of the full Bayesian network can
be found in Figure 9.
4.1 Step 1: the scenarios
The first step in our design method is to formulate all rele-
vant scenarios, and which hypotheses they support. In this
case, there will be scenarios describing that X was the bur-
glar, that X and Y worked together or that Y was the bur-
glar. There is also a scenario describing how X climbed the
window. The scenarios below are based on our interpreta-
tion of the case.
• Scenario 1, supporting the hypothesis that X is guilty
of burglary and worked alone:
X needed money, so X decided to break in.
X broke the window of the house, went in
and took some items from the house.
• Scenario 2, supporting the hypothesis that Y is guilty
of burglary and worked alone:
Figure 6: The same event in two scenarios. Each
scenario is represented as a dotted box for simplicity.
Y needed money, so Y decided to break in.
Y broke the window of the house, went in
and took some items from the house.
• Scenario 3, supporting the hypothesis that X and Y
are guilty of the burglary together:
Y needed money. Y decided to break in. X
and Y had previously committed a crime to-
gether, so Y asked X to help him with a bur-
glary. X broke the window of the house, X
and Y went in and Y took some items from
the house.
• Scenario 4, supporting no hypothesis, but supplying
an alternate explanation for the fingerprint evidence:
X was drunk on a night a few days before
the burglary. X walked by the house and
thought he heard someone calling his name.
Therefore, X climbed on the window.
Note that the guilt hypotheses are mutually exclusive but
the scenarios are not. In particular, the fourth scenario does
not support any guilt hypothesis, nor does it support the
opposite (X is not guilty of burglary): it merely provides
an alternate explanation for the fingerprints on the window.
In the resulting Bayesian network, a higher probability for
this fourth scenario will indirectly lead to a slightly lower
probability for the scenario in which X is the burglar.
4.2 Step 2: the scenario idioms
In the second step of our design method, each scenario is
worked out with the scenario idiom. Figure 4 shows the
scenario idiom for the first scenario, where X was the sole
burglar.
The probability tables for all states and events in the sce-
nario express that they follow logically from the scenario
node. When the scenario node is not true, the numbers ex-
press how probable the state or event is without the context
of the scenario, given the value of the other states and events
to which it is connected. Eliciting these numbers is not at
Figure 7: Conflicting events in two scenarios. Each
scenario is represented as a dotted box for simplicity.
all a trivial task, and it is often a subjective matter (see
[21]). As an illustration we show how some numbers can
be picked. When the scenario node has value true, we have
P (X went into the house=yes| X broke the window=yes,
SCENARIO NODE=yes) = 1. The probability that X went into
the house without the context of this particular scenario is
quite low, since people do not go in to other people’s houses
for no reason. Therefore, we set P (X went into the house
=yes| X broke the window=no, SCENARIO NODE=no) = 0.05.
The other probability tables should be filled in similarly.
The guilt hypothesis follows with probability 1 from the
scenario. The prior probability of the scenario node ex-
presses how plausible the general pattern of this scenario
is, without taking into account any evidence yet. For this
example, we choose a prior probability of P (SCENARIO NODE
= yes) = 0.01. Similarly, the scenario idioms for the other
scenarios are constructed.
4.3 Step 3: merging the scenarios
All scenarios are merged with the merged scenarios idiom.
The first three scenarios support three hypotheses that are
all mutually exclusive: X is guilty, Y is guilty and X and Y
are both guilty. Note that these are really mutually exclu-
sive. In our example case, no two scenarios support the same
hypothesis. When combining the scenarios with the merged
scenarios idiom, a constraint node is added as shown in Fig-
ure 5. In this image, each scenario with all its states and
events is shown schematically as a dotted box, for simplicity.
The constraint node has values allowed and not allowed,
and is always instantiated to allowed. The probability that
the value is allowed is 0 when two or more hypotheses are
true simultaneously, and 1 otherwise.
Now overlapping and conflicting states or events (items 3a
and 3b from Section 3) need to be taken care of. The event
Figure 8: Evidence for two scenarios. Each scenario
is represented as a dotted box for simplicity.
that X broke the window occurs both in the scenario where
X is the sole burglar and in the scenario in which X and
Y worked together (3a). Therefore, when putting the two
scenarios together this is replaced by one node, as shown
in Figure 6. Similarly, the event that Y took items from
the house is the same in the scenario of X and Y working
together and in scenario in which Y is the burglar. These
nodes also become one node in the structure.
The event that X broke the window conflicts with the
event that Y broke the window (3b). Therefore, a constraint
node is added: see Figure 7. Like before, the constraint
node has values allowed and not allowed, and is always
instantiated on allowed. The probability that the value
is allowed is 0 when the two events are both true, and 1
otherwise.
4.4 Step 4: adding the evidence
Finally, evidential nodes are added to the structure. As an
example, we show how the evidence of X’s fingerprints on
the window can be added, see Figure 8. Via an intermediate
node describing that X’s fingerprints were on the window,
it supports both X breaking the window and the event that
X climbed the window. Recall that for the fourth scenario
there was also a witness testimony to state that the window
was recently cleaned, which would almost surely have re-
moved earlier fingerprints from X climbing the window. We
combine this evidence to find a structure as shown in Figure
8, using the evidence accuracy idiom from [13].
Similarly, other evidence can be added to the network.
Figure 9 shows a Bayesian network structure for this case.
5. FEATURES OF THE DESIGN METHOD
The design method as described in this paper models crime
scenarios for a legal case in a Bayesian network. In this
section, some features of the method will be discussed.
The proposed design method has currently been presented
as producing a static representation of all the variables in a
case. Nonetheless, the method can be used to produce new
models at different moments in time, for example during an
investigative process.
The network can be adapted and extended as new evi-
dence and scenarios turn up. In fact, scenarios can help in
the finding of new evidence in the form of so-called story
consequences [6], one source of the critical quenstions that
can drive further investigation [8]. For example, when one
scenario involves the suspect driving off in a red car, wit-
nesses can be sought to testify whether they saw a red car
at the appropriate time. With these story consequences,
scenarios can add relevant variables to the domain that may
otherwise have been overlooked. Had there only been vari-
ables directly concerning the crime or the known evidence,
then the red car would not have been included.
With the scenario idiom, the coherence of a scenario is
modeled in the Bayesian network. A scenario is said to be
a coherent sequence of states and events (see [6, 20]). The
coherence of a scenario reflects that our belief in the entire
scenario strengthens, as we know more about the circum-
stances. For example, when we find that suspect X went
into the house through the window, we tend to believe more
in the entire scenario and all the events it consists of: by
learning that X went into the house through the window, we
believe he probably also took some items from the house.
The scenario idiom captures this coherence by connect-
ing all states and events in one scenario to a scenario node,
resulting in the probabilities in the Bayesian network to be-
have as desired. This is because by construction, all state
and event nodes in the scenario are d-connected: between
any two state or event nodes there is a path through which
information can be transmitted [15]. To see this, consider
the scenario idiom from Figure 4. There cannot be direct
evidence for the scenario node, leaving it uninstantiated.
Since the connections from the scenario node to the state
and event nodes diverge (the arrows do not meet head-to-
head in the scenario node), information about one state or
event is relevant for other states and events in the scenario3.
Therefore, when evidence for one of the states or events of
a scenario is instantiated in the network, this has an effect on
the probability of all states or events in the scenario and the
probability of the guilt hypothesis. We say that evidential
support is transferred via the scenario node.
A less desirable feature of the scenario idiom is that it re-
quires probabilities for some quite abstract connections to be
made explicit, in order to model the coherence of a scenario.
The issue of eliciting the numbers in a Bayesian network is
known, but with the scenario idiom, some particularly ab-
stract connections were introduced. The arrows from the
scenario node to the state or event nodes were said to ex-
press how probable a state or event is without the context of
the scenario (see Section 3). It is to be investigated whether
existing elicitation techniques produce useful numbers for
3Note that for two d-connected nodes, information about
one node is not neccessarily relevant for the other; there
may still be an independence due to the numbers in the
probability tables.
Figure 9: The full graph for the case study
these connections.
A positive feature of the scenario idiom is that it can
model the plausibility of a scenario by means of the prior
probabilities for the scenario node. For example, when a sce-
nario describes a burglary but fails to explain how the bur-
glar got into the house, it will not be perceived as a proper
explanation of what has happened. When this scenario is
modeled in a Bayesian network with our design method, the
low plausibility will be reflected in a low prior probability
for the value true of the scenario node.
Note that a very implausible scenario can become proba-
ble when enough evidence is available. For example, when a
burglar is caught red-handed by the police, it is less impor-
tant to know how he got in. The Bayesian network behaves
the same: a low prior probability can result in a high poste-
rior probability when enough evidence is added.
With the merged scenarios idiom, multiple scenario can be
modeled in one Bayesian network. These various scenarios
can be compared in the network and help to prevent tunnel
vision among judges and jurors.
Including multiple scenarios in one Bayesian network may
lead to a very large network with many nodes (cf. also Figure
9). However, from a modeling perspective it is desirable to
include all scenarios in one network as opposed to separate
networks for each scenario. This is because the scenarios
must be compared, and events and states from different sce-
narios will overlap. When working with separate networks,
the maintenance of equal numbers in different models can be
a cumbersome task, especially when the models frequently
change in the investigative process.
To summarize, the main contribution of the proposed de-
sign method is that it uses crime scenarios as a basis for
a Bayesian network. The advantage of using scenarios lies
in the holistic perspective. Since a scenario considers what
may have happened in a legal case as a whole, it can help
to find more evidence, for example via story consequences.
With the scenario idiom, the coherence of a scenario is
captured as well as its plausibility. However, the scenario
idiom requires some abstract probabilities to be determined.
With the merged scenarios idiom, multiple scenarios can
be modeled in one Bayesian network. This allows for a com-
parison between scenarios, evaluating which is most proba-
ble.
6. RELATEDWORK
In recent work on Bayesian networks applied to legal cases,
Hepler, Dawid and Leucari [14] proposed the idea of often
recurring substructures in Bayesian networks. Fenton, Neil
and Lagnado [13, 12, 18] elaborated on this idea by com-
piling a list of legal idioms: building blocks for the con-
struction of a Bayesian network for a legal case. With their
idioms, Fenton, Neil and Lagnado aimed to systematise the
construction of Bayesian networks for legal cases. Their ap-
proach is very helpful in finding the structure of the network
on a local level. For example, with their evidence accuracy
idiom one can quickly see that any piece of evidence should
be connected to a node that describes the accuracy of evi-
dence.
Our design method extends this local approach to the
holistic perspective of scenarios. We have added two new
idioms, the scenario idiom and the merged scenarios idiom.
With a design method, we can systematically build Bayesian
networks for legal cases based on scenarios.
Scenarios show which variables are relevant to the case
and which are not. Research on the application of narra-
tive to legal cases, such as [20, 26], stresses the importance
of the coherence of a scenario. With the scenario idiom, we
have incorporated the idea of global coherence into our mod-
els. Furthermore, we can compare various scenarios with the
merged scenarios idiom. In our models, scenarios are com-
pared as a whole and not just in terms of their elements.
Comparing multiple scenarios in one Bayesian network is
relevant, since looking at various possible scenarios helps to
prevent tunnel vision with judges and jurors. By incorpo-
rating multiple scenarios and thereby multiple hypotheses,
our design method differs from Fenton, Neil and Lagnado’s
work, who focus on a single hypothesis in their method.
Our proposed design method combined two of the main
approaches to legal reasoning: narrative and probabilistic
reasoning. Recently, Keppens [17] studied the combination
of Bayesian network with argumentation. Silano, Boer and
Van Engers [23] studied narrative applied to law.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described a systematic method for mod-
eling crime scenarios in a Bayesian network. We tested our
method to a case study, where multiple scenarios were mod-
eled in one single Bayesian network for the case. In the
future our method should be further evaluated, for example
by more extensive and realistic case studies.
The described method combines two well-known approaches
for working with legal evidence: probabilistic reasoning in
the form of Bayesian networks and narrative. Like any
model, a Bayesian network is a limited representation of
the real world and represents only as much as the designer
includes. The holistic aspect of narrative helps to find all
relevant variables in a case by considering all possible sce-
narios of what may have happened.
We have built upon work by Hepler, Dawid and Leucari
[14] and Fenton, Neil and Lagnado [13], who proposed to
use legal idioms in the construction of Bayesian networks.
We have added a scenario idiom and a merged scenarios
idiom for working with scenarios, and described a procedure
for systematically constructing the whole Bayesian network
for a case. We have thereby extended the systematization
that the aforementioned authors initiated with the holistic
perspective of scenarios.
Further research is needed on the specification of the prob-
abilities in the probability tables. A number of methods ex-
ist [21] for determining the probabilities in a Bayesian net-
work, but, given the known issue of finding useful numbers,
it is worth investigating how well these methods are suited
for the specific field of law.
Another interesting topic for further research is the coher-
ence of scenarios. In the design method presented here, a
novelty that we introduced was the use of the scenario id-
iom to capture the coherence of scenarios. One step further
would be to develop a numeric measure for the degree of co-
herence of a scenario, by which scenarios can be compared.
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